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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the devastating effects of the global financial crisis
and the collapse of the national housing market, non-profit organizations,
private citizens, and government agencies have increasingly filed
discrimination lawsuits against creditors and mortgage lenders for
extending credit to minority borrowers on terms less favorable than those
offered to white borrowers with similar risk profiles.1 These lawsuits
argue that creditors pursued discriminatory policies, which, although
neutral on their face, have had an adverse and indefensible “disparate
impact” on minority borrowers in violation of numerous
antidiscrimination laws, including the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA).2 Indeed, volumes of evidence now reveal that these challenged
practices directly contributed to minority communities across the country
suffering a greater loss of wealth during the crisis and a slower recovery
in the wake of the crisis.3
To prove wrongdoing, these cases rely on the “disparate impact
theory” of discrimination: a long-recognized legal theory of liability that
permits victims of unequal treatment to prove discrimination by
demonstrating through statistical analysis that a specific practice or
*

J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School. The author thanks Stuart Rossman and
Odette Williamson of the National Consumer Law Center and the editors of the Harvard
Law & Policy Review for excellent comments, edits, and advice.
1
See Michael Aleo & Pablo Svirsky, Foreclosure Fallout: The Banking Industry's
Attack on Disparate Impact Race Discrimination Claims Under the Fair Housing Act
and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 38 (2008).
2
See 59 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 304 (2005). Many of these same lawsuits have
also brought disparate impact discrimination claims under the Fair Housing Act.
3
Expert Report of Thomas J. Sugrue, Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, Case No. 1:12-cv7667-VEC (June 27, 2014) (No. 133), available at http://perma.cc/2FMB-VA9E; DEBBIE
GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN, KEITH S. ERNST & WEI LI, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
UNFAIR LENDING: THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME
MORTGAGES 3 (May 31, 2006), available at http://perma.cc/F4XA-SE9M.
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policy adversely affects a protected class of people.4 Proving a claim for
disparate impact discrimination thus does not require evidence of
discriminatory intent, but rather proof of discriminatory impact.5 Statutes
that make it unlawful to engage in disparate impact discrimination aim
broadly to prevent the incidence and undo the consequences of systemic
discrimination.
Disparate impact cases brought under the ECOA have resulted in
multi-million-dollar class settlements in recent years by companies such
as General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Ford Motor Credit
Company, and Nissan Motors Acceptance Corporation.6 Unsurprising,
therefore, the banking and lending industries have marshaled their
resources to advance a strategic litigation campaign to overturn the
longstanding legal understanding that the ECOA imposes liability for
disparate impact discrimination.7 Although no court has yet to accept
their argument, creditors continue to defend against disparate impact
claims by arguing that the text of the ECOA, read in light of recent
Supreme Court precedent, compels the conclusion that the ECOA neither
proscribes disparate impact discrimination nor permits private plaintiffs
to bring disparate impact claims to challenge lending practices that create
or perpetuate unequal access to credit.
These same advocates have waged a parallel campaign against the
longstanding interpretation that the Fair Housing Act also authorizes
claims for disparate impact discrimination.8 Their efforts to put this issue
before the current Supreme Court have been tenacious, and largely aided
by the conservative Supreme Court Justices who have demonstrated an
eagerness to rule on the issue by continuously granting certiorari in cases
raising it.9 In the face of numerous settlements mooting the issue on

4

Most antidiscrimination statutes protect classes of people based on race, religion,
sex, and national origin, among other protected characteristics. For example, a neutral
practice or policy that substantially and unjustifiably adversely affects Hispanics, or
women, or Catholics in a given area may violate a statute outlawing disparate impact
discrimination on the basis of race, or sex, or religion.
5
59 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 304 (2005).
6
See e.g. Case Index – Closed Cases, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER,
http://perma.cc/T5HL-NWYW; see also 59 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 304 (2005).
7
See Michael Aleo & Pablo Svirsky, Foreclosure Fallout: The Banking Industry's
Attack on Disparate Impact Race Discrimination Claims Under the Fair Housing Act
and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 38–39 (2008).
8
Id.
9
Id. See also Twp. of Mount Holly, N.J. v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action,
Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2824 (2013) (granting certiorari); Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S.Ct. 548
(2011) (granting certiorari).
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appeal,10 advocates engineered a case that wouldn’t be settled, finally
providing the Supreme Court with the opportunity this Term to decide
whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing
Act.11 However, the legal battle over the scope of the FHA’s
discrimination prohibition is merely one offensive in a far more
ambitious campaign to completely eliminate the disparate impact theory
of discrimination from American jurisprudence.12
As such, not only is the specific question of whether the ECOA bars
disparate impact discrimination likely to soon preoccupy the courts, but
the analysis of that question is immediately relevant to the analogous
FHA disparate impact case now before the Supreme Court, and to the
doctrine of disparate impact liability more generally. This paper argues
that the ECOA, in no uncertain terms, prohibits disparate impact
discrimination, and that the lending industry’s argument to the contrary
drastically misconstrues the precedents it relies on, while ignoring other
relevant case law and essential tools of statutory interpretation. More
broadly, this paper clarifies how courts should perform the task of
interpreting whether anti-discrimination laws prohibit disparate impact
discrimination. The fairest method of interpretation—the one most
faithful to congressional intent and most consistent with Supreme Court
precedent—construes the meaning and scope of an antidiscrimination
statute by holistically examining the statute’s text, legislative history,
purpose, interpretations by the implementing agency, treatment of the
issue by the Circuit courts, and related Supreme Court precedent. In
applying this method, it becomes unmistakably clear that the ECOA—as
written and as Congress intended—authorizes claims for disparate
impact discrimination. Not only would it be legal error to hold otherwise,
but a contrary finding would eradicate one of the most effective means of
halting discriminatory practices in credit lending—practices that deeply

10

See e.g. Twp. of Mount Holly, N.J. v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc.,
134 S.Ct. 636 (2013) (dismissing certiorari for mootness); Magner v. Gallagher, 132
S.Ct. 1306 (2012) (dismissing certiorari for mootness).
11
Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., No.
13-1371, 2014 WL 4916193, at *1 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2014) (granting certiorari).
12
This campaign began with the effort to secure a Supreme Court determination that
the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit governmental
policies that have a discriminatory impact on protected classes. See Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Corp. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). As Congress has taken steps to
statutorily forbid, and provide a cause of action to remedy, private instances of both
intentional and disparate impact discrimination, pro-business advocates have increasingly
turned their attention to litigating the meaning and scope of these anti-discrimination
provisions.
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suppress the economic opportunity of poor and marginalized
communities.
II. BACKGROUND: EQUAL ACCESS TO CREDIT AS A CIVIL RIGHT
The 93rd Congress enacted the ECOA to serve two distinct, but
related, purposes: first, to directly address the well-documented and
financially devastating problem of credit discrimination based on
impermissible factors, including race and gender;13 and second, to help
realize that era’s grand endeavor to eliminate poverty and dramatic racial
inequality in America.14 By the time Congress began enacting civil rights
legislation in the mid-1960’s, it was widely recognized that rampant
racial discrimination and inequality persisted across the nation because
the essential building blocks of social and economic advancement—
employment, education, housing, and credit—had been systematically
denied to minority segments of the population. In essence, the ongoing
inaccessibility of gainful employment, decent education, valuable
housing, and fair-term lending ensured that African-Americans were less
likely to accumulate wealth or equity, trapping generation after
generation within an ongoing cycle of historically-rooted poverty.15
It is no coincidence, therefore, that civil rights advocates prioritized
and championed legal campaigns to dismantle inequality and
discrimination in the spheres of education, employment, housing, and
financial services throughout the civil rights era.16 Beginning with the
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education,
climaxing with the sequential passage of two Civil Rights Acts in 1964
and 1968 outlawing employment, education, voting, and housing
discrimination, and concluding with the enactment of the ECOA
protecting equal access to credit, the federal government erected a legal
apparatus that advanced the grand task of eradicating the most socially
destructive forms of discrimination. In pursuit of this goal, Congress
devised and the courts recognized the disparate impact theory of
discrimination to give legal force to the understanding that practices
“which operate unfairly because of the historical discrimination that
13

See infra Part III.C.
This Legislative and Executive endeavor consisted of a series of sweeping
domestic welfare reforms in the mid-1960’s, referred to as the “Great Society.”
15
Expert Report of Thomas J. Sugrue, Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, Case No. 1:12-cv7667-VEC at 49–50 (June 27, 2014) (No. 133), available at http://perma.cc/J4MCQ3PU.
16
See generally JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED
BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994).
14
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undergirds them” and cause protected groups to suffer adverse impact
ought to be outlawed as a matter of public policy.17
The well-documented history of housing segregation and
discrimination in the first half of the twentieth century made it
abundantly clear that any committed effort to de-stratify American
society along racial lines required legislation ensuring equal access to
credit. Thus, in March 1976, Congress passed an amendment to the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act requiring financial institutions to make
credit equally available to all creditworthy consumers without
discriminating against any applicant on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin, age, sex or marital status.18 Section 1691(b) authorizes
the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) to promulgate regulations “to require
that financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of
credit make that credit equally available to all creditworthy customers.”19
One year to the day after Congress enacted the ECOA, the FRB
implemented a new rule giving effect to the Act’s purposes and
provisions and outlawing disparate impact discrimination.20
While the enacting Congress viewed the ECOA as an integral piece
of remedial legislation to end the discriminatory denial of credit, history
has shown that the Act was needed as much as a prophylactic against
ensuing discriminatory lending to poor, predominately African American
communities. Beginning in the early 1980’s, the old practice of refusing
credit to low-income, minority communities—which the ECOA
expressly prohibited—was replaced by the equally devastating practice
of targeting these same communities for high-risk, high-interest loans. In
the same years that the credit industry was expanding into these markets,
it adopted business models based entirely on risk and ushered in a new
era of deregulation and limited oversight.21 Unsurprisingly, it was during

17
Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.Supp. 505, 518 (E.D. Va. 1968); see Robert
Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and Resurrection of the
Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431, 434–435
(2005). In disparate impact claims, plaintiffs are still required to show causation, and a
defendant may defend against the claim by showing a legitimate business reason for the
challenged practice. See 59 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 304.
18
The original enactment of the ECOA in 1974 only prohibited discrimination on
the basis of sex and marital status. While there was Congressional inertia to include race
as a prohibited factor in this legislation, the parties failed to reach a compromise and such
legislation was enacted as an Amendment to the original ECOA in 1976.
19
Pub. L. 93-495 § 502.
20
See 12 C.F.R. §§ 202 et seq.
21
Benjamin Howell, Exploiting Race and Space: Concentrated Subprime Lending
as Housing Discrimination, 94 CAL. L. REV. 101, 102 (2006).
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this “perfect storm” that subprime mortgage lending began to flourish.22
Borrowers who were at high-risk of defaulting were specifically targeted
for loans with terms that almost ensured the borrower would not be able
to pay back their mortgage and enjoy the wealth-building benefits of
homeownership.23 At the same time, the rise of the secondary mortgage
market, consisting of securitized loans, incentivized lenders to make and
securitize the largest quantity of mortgages possible, without regard for
the financial position and stability of the borrower.24 In order to satiate
the growing demand for securitized loans from investors on Wall Street,
creditors substantially weakened their underwriting standards, which in
turn caused lenders to approve an abundance of loans to poor borrowers
who could not afford the loan and who would likely not have been
approved for a loan under traditional underwriting criteria.25 Lending
institutions extended a high percentage of these toxic loans to minority
borrowers through discriminatory underwriting and targeting criteria.26
The ECOA—along with the Fair Housing Act, as currently
interpreted by the Department of Justice and the Department of Housing
and Urban Development—is an integral tool in halting lending practices
that discriminate against protected groups and perpetuate historic
inequalities. The Act is centrally concerned with equalizing access to
credit; in other words, it mandates exactly what its name suggests—
equal credit opportunity. To accomplish this, the ECOA not only
punishes intentional discrimination, but also outlaws facially neutral
lending practices that result in minority borrowers holding riskier and
costlier loans then they otherwise would qualify for and then creditors
extend to white borrowers in comparable financial circumstances. In so
doing, the Act provides a mechanism for eliminating all lending
practices that result in unequal access to credit.27
22
Gregory D. Squires, Urban Development and Unequal Access to Housing
Finance Services, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 255, 260 (2008/2009).
23
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1261–65 (2005).
24
See Expert Report of Patricia A. McCoy, Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, Case No.
1:12-cv-7667-VEC at 23–24 (October 23, 2014) (No. 130), available at
http://perma.cc/32BS-RPVM.
25
Id.
26
Vicki Been, Ingrid Ellen & Josiah Madar, The High Cost of Segregation:
Exploiting Racial Disparities in High-Cost Lending, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361, 363–
370 (2009); see also Expert Report of Ian Ayres, Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, Case No.
1:12-cv-7667-VEC (October 23, 2014) (No. 131), available at http://perma.cc/6KHMRS3E.
27
See Jamie Duitz, Battling Discriminatory Lending: Taking A Multidimensional
Approach Through Litigation, Mediation, and Legislation, J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 101, 107 (Fall 2010).
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III. THE FAIR AND FAITHFUL METHOD OF INTERPRETING ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS
The argument that the ECOA incorporates a disparate impact theory
of liability is convincing under each accepted tool of statutory
interpretation: the text, legislative history, statutory purpose,
interpretations by the implementing agency, and Supreme Court and
Circuit court precedents all support this interpretation. The conclusion is
simply undeniable, however, when the issue is evaluated by holistically
examining all of these tools, which is the analytic approach that the
Supreme Court has consistently employed when interpreting
antidiscrimination provisions.
The Court first developed its interpretive model for resolving
whether a statute bars disparate impact discrimination in the 1971 case of
Griggs v. Duke Power Company.28 Griggs presented a challenge to the
government’s interpretation of Title VII as barring both intentional and
disparate impact employment discrimination. Relying principally on
congressional purpose and the interpretation of the implementing agency
(the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)), a majority
of the Court found that Title VII bars disparate impact employment
discrimination because “practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their
face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they
operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices.”29 The application of disparate impact liability in this case
became widely known as the Griggs “effects test.”
The Court in Griggs reasoned that “[t]he objective of Congress in the
enactment of Title VII”30 and “[t]he administrative interpretation of the
Act by the enforcing agency”31 required a finding that Title VII mandates
“the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classification.”32 Thus, disparate
impact liability was, from the start, grounded in legislative purpose and
agency interpretation. In fact, the Court emphasized that “[t]he
administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is
entitled to great deference,”33 and concluded, “[f]rom the sum of the
28

401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Id. at 430.
30
Id. at 429.
31
Id. at 433–34.
32
Id. at 430.
33
Id. at 433–34.
29
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legislative history relevant in this case, the conclusion is inescapable that
the EEOC's construction of [Title VII] . . . comports with congressional
intent.”34 Ever since, the Court has employed the analytical framework it
used in Griggs to determine whether a civil rights anti-discrimination
statute cognizes claims for disparate impact discrimination.35
Most recently, in Smith v. City of Jackson,36 the Court again held that
a civil-rights era anti-discrimination statute—the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA)37—bars disparate impact discrimination.38
The Court arrived at its conclusion by applying the Griggs method of
examining the evidence of Congress’s intent to prohibit disparate impact
discrimination and heeding the interpretation of the implementing
agency (the EEOC).39 Writing for a majority, Justice Stevens determined
that the provision prohibiting conduct that “adversely affects”
employment on the basis of age evinced a congressional intent to
proscribe disparate impact employment discrimination.40 Concurring,
Justice Scalia found that the ADEA supported disparate impact claims
because the EEOC’s endorsement of this interpretation was owed
substantial deference.41
Contrary to the banking industry’s efforts to cast dicta in Smith as
establishing a rule that antidiscrimination statutes must contain specific
“effects” language in order to support disparate impact claims,42 the
Supreme Court confirmed that the availability of disparate impact claims
turns solely on Congress’s intent to proscribe disparate impact
34

Id. at 436.
See e.g. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571 (1974) (plurality opinion); Guardians
Assn. v. Civil Service Comm'n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, 592–93 (1983)
(plurality opinion) (holding that Title VI prohibits disparate impact discrimination by
relying on text, agency interpretation, and the congressional reenactment doctrine);
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299 (1985) (relying on precedent, legislative history,
and the statutory objective of the act, the Court "assume[d] without deciding that [the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973] reaches at least some conduct that has an unjustifiable
disparate impact upon the handicapped."); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53
(2003) (stating that "both disparate-treatment and disparate-impact claims are cognizable
under the [Americans with Disabilities Act," by referring to text and precedent but not
offering further discussion.).
36
544 U.S. 228 (2005).
37
29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (1967).
38
See 544 U.S. at 240.
39
544 U.S. 228, 235–36 (2005).
40
See id.
41
544 U.S. at 243 (Scalia, J., concurring).
42
See Michael Aleo & Pablo Svirsky, Foreclosure Fallout: The Banking Industry's
Attack On Disparate Impact Race Discrimination Claims Under The Fair Housing Act
And The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 41–49 (Fall 2008)
(describing cases).
35
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discrimination, as evidenced by the statutory text, the legislative history,
the purpose of the statute, the implementing agency’s interpretation,
Circuit court decisions and related Supreme Court precedent.43 Each of
these interpretive tools unquestionably reveal that Congress intended the
ECOA to prohibit disparate impact discrimination.
IV. INTERPRETING THE ECOA’S PROHIBITION ON DISPARATE IMPACT
DISCRIMINATION
A. The Text
In 1976, Congress enhanced a previously-enacted prohibition against
credit discrimination on the basis of gender and marital status by
expanding the prohibited criteria on which a creditor could base a credit
transaction to include race, color, religion, national origin, and age.44 As
amended, the antidiscrimination clause of the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act45 reads:
§ 1691. Scope of prohibition
(a) It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against
any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction-(1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or
marital status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to
contract);
(2) because all or part of the applicant’s income derives from
any public assistance program; or
(3) because the applicant has in good faith exercised any right
under this chapter.46
The statute makes it unlawful “to discriminate,” the ordinary
meaning of which means “unfairly treat a person or group of people
differently from other people or groups.”47 Nothing in the definition of
the word “discriminate” implies that the conduct must be intentional. In
fact, this provision is immediately followed by two subsections listing
discriminatory conduct that does not constitute discrimination under

43
544 U.S. at 232–33, 238 (plurality opinion); id. at 248, 253–56 (O’Connor, J.
concurring).
44
Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–239, 90 Stat. 251.
45
15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 et seq. (1976).
46
15 U.S.C. § 1691(a).
47
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, available at http://perma.cc/DG4C-5ELL.
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section 1691(a).48 The terms “unintentional discrimination” or “disparate
impact discrimination” appear nowhere on this list, nor does any
language describing conduct similar to the concept of disparate impact
discrimination.49 Under the long-recognized canon of statutory
interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the express mention
of one thing excludes all others—activities that constitute discrimination
under the plain definition of that term, and which are not included within
an express list of activities that do not constitute discrimination under the
Act, are presumed to be included within the scope of the Act’s
prohibition. In other words, because Congress did lay out a set of
activities that do not violate section 1691(a), but did not include
disparate impact discrimination within that list, it should be presumed
that Congress intended for this standard form of discrimination to violate
the Act.
Additionally, the ECOA peculiarly includes a “good faith defense”
in the statute, which lends substantial support to the interpretation that
the ECOA bars disparate impact discrimination. Within the section of the
statute that authorizes a private right of action against a violation of the
ECOA, the statute provides that “no provision of this subchapter
imposing liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in
conformity with any official rule, regulation, or interpretation thereof by
the Bureau.”50 By definition, “good faith” is a defense to a claim of
intentional discrimination—one has not intentionally discriminated if
one believed in good faith they were not discriminating. Thus, if
Congress had intended to only outlaw intentional credit discrimination,
the inclusion of a “good faith defense” against such acts would be
superfluous. Because all parts of a statute are to be given effect when
interpreting a specific provision, and an interpretation of one provision
that renders another unnecessary or nugatory are disfavored by the
Court,51 one can only conclude, as at least one lower court has, “that the
‘good faith defense’ provision was incorporated into the ECOA because
48

15 U.S.C. § 1691(b)–(c).
Subsection (b) provides that it does not constitute discrimination under the ECOA
for a creditor to inquire about the marital status or age of an applicant in order to
ascertain credit-relevant information, such as income levels, credit history, or the
creditor’s rights and remedies applicable to the particular extension of credit. Subsection
(c) provides that it is not a violation of the ECOA to refuse to extend credit to an
applicant on the terms of a credit assistance program offered by the government,
nonprofit organizations, or for-profit special purpose credit programs that meet Bureauprescribed standards. Id.
50
15 U.S.C. § 1691(e).
51
See e.g. Fidelity Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 163
(1982).
49
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the statute reaches beyond intentional discrimination to include conduct
and practices that have unintentional discriminatory effects.”52 In other
words, the best reading of the statute as a whole is that the ECOA
prohibits both intentional and disparate impact discrimination and that
Congress provided creditors with a statutory good faith defense against
all violations of the Act.
B. Legislative History
The legislative history of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act specifies
that the enacting Congress intended this legislation to bar disparate
impact discrimination. Legislative Reports and hearing testimony
accompanying the drafting and passage of the bill specifically state that
the law prohibits lending practices that have a discriminatory effect on
protected classes. These legislative materials further explain that the law
reaches the same discriminatory conduct as Title VII does in the
employment discrimination context, often explicitly referencing and
endorsing the Griggs effects test in discussions about the meaning and
scope of the ECOA’s anti-discrimination provision. This history
documenting the intentions and understandings of the enacting Congress
shows in explicit terms that it drafted and passed the ECOA with the
intent to bar disparate impact.
The legislative origins of the ECOA date to the early 1970’s when
various members of Congress introduced bills to address credit
discrimination against groups who were systematically denied financial
opportunity and independence—namely, women and African
Americans.53 The Congressional hearings leading to the enactment of the
1974 ECOA, barring credit discrimination on the basis of sex and marital
status, and those leading to the 1976 ECOA Amendments, publically
grappled with the appropriate standard of proof to be used in the area of
credit and lending discrimination.54
Within this debate, the effectiveness and suitability of outlawing
credit practices that had a discriminatory effect on protected classes was
openly considered and carefully assessed.55 For example, Congress
members and witnesses testifying in committee debated whether the
52

Osborne v. Bank of Am., Nat. Ass'n, 234 F.Supp.2d 804, 811 n.4 (M.D. Tenn.

2002).
53

See e.g. H.R. 14856, H.R. 14908.
See infra Part D.
55
See Marcia K. Baer, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the "Effects Test", 95
BANKING L.J. 241, 246–251 (1978) (discussing legislative history of the ECOA “effects
test”).
54
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1974 ECOA should define the discriminatory conduct it aimed to
prohibit as “invidious discrimination,” “arbitrary discrimination,” or
simply “discrimination” with no limiting or explanatory modifier. The
terms “invidious discrimination” and “arbitrary discrimination” were
technical legal terms then used by the courts to describe a category of
discriminatory conduct that included both intentional discrimination and
conduct producing discriminatory effects.56 Ultimately, the
subcommittee unanimously voted to include only the word
“discriminate” and allow the courts to determine the full scope of the
statutory prohibition.57
Because this legislation was considered in the final days of the 93rd
Congress, it was only possible to gather enough votes to enact a law
prohibiting credit discrimination on the basis of sex and marital status,
rather than all suspect classifications.58 Almost immediately upon
convening, however, the next Congress resumed the effort to pass
comprehensive legislation outlawing all forms of credit discrimination.
The bill that emerged from this effort and gained speedy passage in the
House of Representatives was H.R. 6516, which would go on to pass the
Senate, with minor revisions, within a year and become law as the
ECOA Amendments. The Senate and House Committee Reports
accompanying H.R. 6516 indicate clearly that both houses of Congress
intended this landmark legislation to bar disparate impact discrimination.
The Reports specify that the Act applies to both lending practices
that are motivated by discrimination and those that have a discriminatory
effect.59 Additionally, the Reports state that Congress intended the
ECOA’s prohibition against credit discrimination to be analogous to
Title VII’s prohibition against employment discrimination, as the
Supreme Court had interpreted it in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. five years
earlier.
The House Committee Report60 endorses the Griggs “effects test” as
a method for proving discrimination under the ECOA. Commenting on a
provision in an early draft of H.R. 6516 (later deleted) that stated it was
not necessarily a violation of the ECOA to lend to protected groups in
proportions unequal to that group’s population percentage or to disregard

56

See Hearings on H.R. 14856 and H.R. 14908 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35, 56–65
(1974).
57
Id. at 402.
58
H.R. REP. NO. 210, at 5 (1975).
59
See e.g. S. REP. NO. 589, at 4, 5 (1976).
60
H.R. REP. NO. 210, at 5 (1975).
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a borrower’s protected status when determining creditworthiness, the
Report states:
These provisions are not, however, intended to limit the use of
population statistics to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination in accordance with the “effects” test established
by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971), or otherwise to overrule the holding of the case. For
example, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board uses the Griggs
effects test in connection with alleged “redlining” of geographic
areas by mortgage lenders, and the provision is not intended to
affect the Board's enforcement efforts . . . . The Committee
recognizes that in a number of civil rights cases courts have
ruled that statistical evidence can be used to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination, shifting the burden of proof to the
defendant to prove nondiscrimination. The language of [the Act]
does not challenge this general legal principle.61
More importantly, the provision this comment was addressing—
which appears to be an attempt to limit liability for disparate impact
discrimination—was eventually deleted and does not appear in the final
version of the bill that passed the House of Representatives on June 3,
1975.62
That July, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs held a series of hearings to consider H.R. 6516 and a number of
other similar bills63 to amend the 1974 ECOA. Both advocates and
opponents of disparate impact liability acknowledged at these hearings
that H.R. 6516 (and its Senate equivalent, S. 1927) were written to
outlaw disparate impact credit discrimination. Werner H. Kamarsky,
Commissioner of the New York State Division of Human Rights,
understood the bill to address “the consequences [and] not simply the
motivation” of discrimination, in the same way that Title VII addresses
both intentional and unintentional employment discrimination.64 His
testimony was solicited in part to educate committee members that
61

Id.
See 121 CONG. REC. H4780–4791 (daily ed. June 3, 1975).
63
S. 483, S. 1900, S. 1927 (essentially analogous to H.R. 6516), S. 1961, and H.R.
6516.
64
Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments and Consumer Leasing Act: Hearings
on S. 483, S. 1900, S. 1927, S. 1961 & H.R. 6516 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 47–48 (1975) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co.).
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statistical evidence of discrimination is as applicable in the credit and
lending fields as it is in the employment context. On the other side of the
debate, the International Consumer Credit Association also agreed that
H.R. 6516 authorized claims for disparate impact discrimination. In a
letter imploring Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), who introduced H.R.
6516 in the Senate, to reconsider his support for the bill, the International
Consumer Credit Association wrote:
[B]oth H.R. 6516 and S. 1927 were drafted to maintain the so
called ‘rule of proportionality’ known as the ‘effects test of
discrimination’ handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1971. S. 1927 was drafted on H.R. 6516 and the legislative
history of that bill makes it clear that H.R. 6516 is a civil rights
measure intended to supplement and strengthen existing civil
rights acts. Thus, both bills intend for credit to be granted
proportionally to applicants on the basis of sex, marital status,
race, color, religion, national origin and even age. If that is not
the intention of the sponsors, then both bills need to be amended
to make the real intention(s) clear.65
The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
subsequently adopted H.R. 6516, prepared a Committee Report to
accompany the bill, and reported it favorably to the full Senate for a
vote. This Senate Report also embraces the Griggs “effects test” and
exhibits a clear intent for the ECOA to outlaw both intentional and
disparate impact credit discrimination. The Report reads:
The prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion or national origin are unqualified. In the
Committee's view, these characteristics are totally unrelated to
creditworthiness and cannot be considered by any creditor. In
determining the existence of discrimination on these grounds, as
well as on the other grounds discussed below, courts or agencies
are free to look at the effects of a creditor's practices as well as
the creditor's motives or conduct in individual transactions. Thus
judicial constructions of anti-discrimination legislation in the
employment field, in cases such as Griggs v. Duke Power
Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and Albemarle Paper Company
v. Moody (U.S. Supreme Court, June 25, 1975), are intended to

65
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serve as guides in the application of this Act, especially with
respect to the allocations of burdens of proof.66
The Senate passed its version of H.R. 6516 and after a Conference
Committee aligned the slight differences between the two bill, both
houses passed the ECOA Amendments on March 23, 1976. As explained
in further detail below, the federal agency charged with implementing
the statute then interpreted the law as outlawing disparate impact
discrimination and promulgated rules accordingly.67 Every court to then
address this rarely-contested issue concurred that the ECOA prohibits
creditors from engaging in lending practices that have a discriminatory
effect on protected groups.68 Twenty years later, Congress enacted a
series of amendments to the ECOA in the Economic Growth and
Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996.69 Yet during this time,
Congress made no effort to revise the long-recognized interpretation that
the ECOA authorizes claims for disparate impact discrimination. Under
the legislative reenactment doctrine of statutory construction, a court
should presume that Congress has acquiesced to a longstanding judicial
or administrative legal interpretation of a statute if Congress later revisits
the statute and does not substantially alter or redefine the established
interpretation. As such, courts should continue to hold that the enacting
Congress intended, and subsequent Congresses confirmed, that the
ECOA prohibits disparate impact discrimination.

C. Statutory Purpose
The legislative history of the ECOA also sheds valuable light on
Congress’s reasons for enacting the law as written and the purposes
Congress intended the Act to fulfill. An examination of the statute read
in light of its historical and political context reveals, in short, that the
ECOA was conceived and implemented to be a ground-breaking law,
66

S. REP. NO. 589, at 4, 5 (1976).
See infra Part D.
68
See e.g. Bhandari v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 808 F.2d 1082, 1101 (5th Cir.
1987), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 492 U.S. 901 (1989); Miller v. Am.
Express Co., 688 F.2d 1235, 1239–40 (9th Cir. 1982); Haynes v. Bank of Wedowee, 634
F.2d 266, 269 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981); Gross v. United States Small Bus. Admin., 669 F.
Supp. 50 (N.D.N.Y. 1987); Sayers v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 522 F.Supp. 835
(W.D. Mo. 1981); Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F.Supp. 1026 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
69
Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996, H.R. 3810,
142d Cong., contained in the Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104–208, 142
Cong. Rec. H11755 (Sept. 28, 1996) (enacted).
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designed for, and capable of, eradicating systemic discrimination in the
area of credit lending. Reading the statute as barring disparate impact
discrimination is most consistent with this purpose.
Evidence of this purpose comes from the text itself and the
legislative history. As written, the statute sweeps within its ambit all
credit transactions, regulating not just consumer lending but also
extensions of credit to small businesses, large corporations, partnerships,
and trusts.70 The goal for enacting such a comprehensive law was to
provide the public with “the strongest possible law on credit
discrimination.”71 From the beginning, the ECOA was no “half-way
measure[]”72 towards achieving Congress’s stated goal “to prevent the
kinds of credit discrimination which have occurred in the past, and to
anticipate and prevent discriminatory practices in the future.”73 Neutral
credit policies that had a discriminatory effect on minority and
marginalized consumers represented exactly the “kinds of credit
discrimination” that had occurred in the past and that Congress
anticipated would continue to occur in the future in the absence of
intervening legislation.
A closer look at the historical context in which the ECOA was
enacted further supports this conclusion. The impetus for enacting new
civil rights protections in 1968 was spurred in part by nationwide riots
challenging racial segregation and discrimination. In response, President
Johnson commissioned the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders to identify the root causes of these race riots. The resulting
Kerner Report concluded that the riots were a direct result of the “nation
[] moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and
unequal.”74 In particular, the Kerner Report identified residential
segregation and structural discrimination within society’s essential social
and economic spheres as the primary cause of the widespread racial
tension and violence.75 The Commission recommended that Congress
pass comprehensive legal reforms to eliminate housing discrimination
and the unequal availability of similarly integral social and economic
necessities.76 Within two months of the report’s release, Congress passed
70
15 U.S.C. § 1691a(e)–(f) (1994); Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending,
59 Fed. Reg. 18,267 (1994).
71
121 CONG. REC. S10443–10445 (daily ed. June 12, 1975).
72
Id.
73
S. REP. NO. 94-589, at 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 403, 406.
74
KERNER COMM’N, REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS
(1968).
75
See id. at 13.
76
Id.
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the Civil Rights Act of 1968, outlawing discrimination in the sale, rental,
and financing of housing and imposing penalties for willfully injuring,
intimidating or interfering with a person’s efforts to partake of society’s
most basic opportunities, including: a public education; access to
commercial goods, services, and facilities; participation in government
programs and services; a gainful employment; jury duty; voting; and
interstate travel.77
By 1974, however, Congress understood it had neglected to
safeguard one other fundamental necessity of modern life from
discrimination: credit. Beginning in the early 1970’s, numerous instances
of denial of credit for reasons other than a person's creditworthiness were
brought to the attention of the House Committee on Banking, Currency
and Housing.78 Ensuing hearings before the Committee produced
compelling testimony about the critical importance of credit, which the
Committee resoundingly adopted as its chief reason for why Congress
should address discrimination in credit transactions. Describing the need
for such legislation, the Committee wrote in its Report recommending
passage of the ECOA:
It would be difficult to exaggerate the role of credit in our
society. Credit is involved in an almost endless variety of
transactions reaching from the medical delivery of the newborn
to the rituals associated with the burial of the dead. The
availability of credit often determines an individual's effective
range of social choice and influences such basic life matters as
selection of occupation and housing. Indeed, the availability of
credit has a profound impact on an individual's ability to exercise
the substantive civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
In light of this vital role that credit plays in society, the Committee
determined that a prohibition on credit discrimination would constitute
“landmark legislation” for its promise to “pertain[] directly to the
problem of credit discrimination” by fully “forbid[ing] discrimination
based on race, color, religion, national origin and age in all areas of
credit, not just mortgage finance.”79 Taking up consideration of the
legislation, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs agreed that “[c]redit has ceased to be a luxury item,” noting
77

Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
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See H.R. REP NO. 210, at 3,5 (1975); 121 CONG. REC. S10443–10445 (daily ed.
June 12, 1975).
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especially that, “[v]irtually all home purchases are made on credit. About
two-thirds of consumer automobile purchases are on an installment basis.
Large department stores report that 50% or more of their sales are on
revolving or closed-end credit plans. Upwards of 15% of all consumer
disposable income is devoted to credit obligations other than home
mortgages.”80
The Senate and House sponsors of the bill also garnered support for
the legislation while repeatedly emphasizing that because credit is a
necessity, the law must guarantee full and equal access to it. House
sponsor Representative Frank Annunzio (D-IL) advocated that
“consumer credit is more important than ever to the lives of Americans,”
and “the right to get credit on a nondiscriminatory basis and maintain an
accurate credit record is no longer the luxury it used to be—it is a
necessity.”81 Introducing the House-passed bill in the Senate, Senator
Biden affirmed:
Credit has become an increasingly important part of the wellbeing of consumers and their families. In many cases credit is
virtually a necessity if consumers are to participate in the fruits
of our American economy—homes, auto-mobiles, appliances are
more often purchased on credit than on a cash basis . . . nearly
15 percent of all consumer disposable income is allocated to
repayment of installment debt. No form of consumer credit has
grown so rapidly as that available through credit cards, which
offer consumers unprecedented convenience and purchasing
power. In this marketplace it is intolerable that some
consumers—because of the accident of their age, or color or
ethnic origins—should be foreclosed from their equitable share
of credit.82
Additionally, months before Senator Biden introduced H.R. 6516 in
the Senate, Senator William Brock III (R-TN) first introduced another
version of a bill to amend the ECOA. Senator Brock’s bill focused only
on prohibiting discrimination in credit transactions on the basis of age in
an effort to halt certain concerning credit policies that were having a
disparate impact on the elderly.83 In introducing his bill, Senator Brock
explained that the legislation would “solve this one unconscionable
problem” of creditors “discriminating against our older citizens simply
80
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because of their age . . . [by], for instance, bas[ing] credit worthiness
primarily on evidence of gainful full-time employment, while
disregarding the fact that retired persons no longer need to rely on
employment for their incomes. This practice continues, although
proceeds from social security, pensions, and annuities tend to be more
permanent and reliable than income from employment.”84 In other
words, the first bill to extend the 1974 ECOA that the Senate considered
also demonstrates that the problem Congress had identified had more to
do with lending policies that had an unjustifiable discriminatory effect on
certain groups, rather than with intentional credit discrimination. This
bill was considered by the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs at the same time the Committee was drafting its version of H.R.
6516 for adoption.
It may fairly be said, therefore, that the legislative purpose of the
ECOA was to ensure that the necessary and precious commodity of
credit was fairly and equally available to all consumers. Members of
Congress were concerned, in other words, with the actual incidence and
effects of lending discrimination—regardless of whether it resulted from
lending practices that were intentionally or unintentionally
discriminatory. Their concern over unequal access to credit was coupled
with the understanding that policies which had discriminatory effects
pervasively hinder the fair and equal extension of credit. The most
rational understanding of their legislative work, therefore, is that they
sought to impose liability for engaging in lending practices that created
or perpetuated the unequal or discriminatory denial of a critical financial
service—no other remedy scheme would more directly address the
specific problem Congress identified and sought to correct with the
passage of the ECOA. Furthermore, the legislative materials repeatedly
emphasize the landmark nature of this bill, suggesting that the enacting
Congress was not engaged in crafting standard or limited legislation on
this issue, but rather was pursuing the enactment of unconventional and
transformational legislation that could quickly and effectively remedy
credit discrimination. Placing the burden on minority consumers to prove
intentional discrimination in order to secure nondiscriminatory access to
credit would seriously undercut this goal; whereas placing the burden on
lending institutions to show their practices do not result in unequal and
discriminatory access to credit is a policy choice that directly reflects the
enacting Congress’s goal for the ECOA to be a momentous piece of civil
rights legislation.

84
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D. Agency Interpretation
The ECOA grants the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) broad
rulemaking authority to issue implementing regulations and expound on
the meaning of the terms in the statute.85 Upon passage of the 1974
ECOA, the FRB issued Regulation B86 implementing the Act’s
prohibition against credit discrimination on the basis of sex or marital
status. In December 1976, the FRB amended Regulation B to incorporate
the Act’s recently expanded coverage to prohibit discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, and age. In the process of
drafting, enacting, and subsequently amending Regulation B, the agency
extensively examined the scope and meaning of the ECOA. It held
hearings, solicited comments, and reviewed the text and legislative
history of the Act to arrive at a final rule governing the information a
creditor may consider when evaluating an application for credit. That
rule explicitly endorses the interpretation that the ECOA outlaws
disparate impact discrimination and makes it illegal for a creditor to use
information in a way that causes a discriminatory effect on protected
groups.87
The FRB began its process of developing and arriving at this rule by
first concluding from the legislative record that the ECOA “proscribes
intentional discrimination and, also may be interpreted as prohibiting
actions that have the effect of discriminating against applicants on any
prohibited basis.”88 Accordingly, in the summer of 1976, it proposed a
rule that creditors may not use information “for the purpose of
discriminating against an applicant on a prohibited basis,” and specified
that this includes the use of general or facially neutral information that is
“not causally related to a determination of creditworthiness where the
effect of using such information would be to discriminate against an
applicant on a prohibited basis, even though the creditor may have no
intent to discriminate.” The Board acknowledged that the use of certain
information “may deny credit to a class of persons protected by the
[ECOA] at a substantially higher rate than persons not of that class,” and
determined “in accordance with the Board's understanding of the Griggs
decision, [that] such use may be a violation of [the ECOA] unless the
creditor establishes that the information has a manifest relationship to
85
See 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(g) (“Any reference to any requirement imposed under this
subchapter or any provision thereof includes reference to the regulations of the Board
under this subchapter or the provision thereof in question.”).
86
12 C.F.R. § 202.
87
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creditworthiness.” The Board elaborated that “in accordance with the
Albemarle decision,” if the use of other information would have a less
discriminatory effect and would equally predict creditworthiness, then a
creditor’s refusal to use this information instead of that which has a
discriminatory effect “would be evidence the creditor was employing the
information used merely as a pretext for discrimination, e.g., with the
intent of discriminating against applicants on a prohibited basis.”89
A thorough explanation of the agency’s reasoning behind this
proposed provision and its interpretation of §1691 of the ECOA was
included in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Hearing
issued to the public. It explained that the ECOA “proscribes intentional
discrimination and, also may be interpreted as prohibiting actions that
have the effect of discriminating against applicants on any prohibited
basis” because the Act’s language is similar to that of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits hiring methods “that are
discriminatory in effect even though neutral in purpose,” and because
“Congress intended certain judicial decisions enunciating this ‘effects
test’ from the employment area to be applied in the credit area.” The
Board announced that it interpreted the application of an “effects test” to
the credit area to mean that:
[T]he use of certain information in determining creditworthiness,
even though such information is not specifically proscribed by
[the proposed rule], may violate the [ECOA] if the use of that
information has the effect of denying credit to a class of persons
protected by the [ECOA] at a substantially higher rate than
persons not of that class, unless the creditor is able to establish
that the information has a manifest relationship to
creditworthiness. Even then, if an aggrieved applicant could
show that a creditor could have used a less discriminatory
method which would serve the creditor's need to evaluate
creditworthiness as well as the challenged method, a violation
may be found to exist.90
Subsequent to publishing its proposed rule and inviting comment,
the FRB also held hearings in August 1976. At this time, the proposed
revisions came under intense scrutiny for adopting disparate impact
liability as law under the ECOA in too passive and trivializing a way.
Roger S. Kuhn of the Center for National Policy Review, Catholic
89
90
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University School of Law, best articulated this view when he testified
before the FRB that a “major point on which the Board's proposal is
inexplicably deficient [is] the exposition of the so-called ‘effects test’ of
discrimination embodied in the ECOA.” He criticized the Board’s
treatment of the issue as “hesitant and misleading” for failing to spell out
what the effects test means and for framing the rule as prohibiting the
use of information “for the purpose of discriminating,” when “this
language contradicts the very essence of the effects test and
the Griggs case, which unequivocally state that purpose is irrelevant.”
Additionally, the proposed rule ambiguously stated that the use of
criteria which disproportionately discriminates against members of a
protected class “may be a violation” of the law, which Mr. Kuhn noted is
nonsensical because the Griggs effects test makes clear that “unless such
a criterion is manifestly related to creditworthiness, its use is a violation
of the law. There is no room for any other understanding, and the
regulations should so state unequivocally.” Finally, the Board’s
interpretation of the application of Albemarle to the area of credit
discrimination was scrutinized for suggesting “that a borrower must
prove that a criterion was used with the intent to discriminate, which
once again is precisely what the borrower need not prove.”91
Based on this and similar testimony and comments received, the
Board revised portions of its July draft of Regulation B in November
1976.92 In its revisions, the Board changed the phrasing of its prohibition
on the use of information “for the purpose of discriminating” to the
current wording of barring information “used to discriminate.” The rule
was also altered to eliminate the vague “may be a violation” language in
favor of the unequivocal and wholesale adoption of the “effects test
concept, as outlined in the employment field by the Supreme Court in the
cases of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. [] and Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, [] to be applicable to a creditor's determination of
creditworthiness.”93 Finally, the Board further clarified the meaning of
the effects test by explaining that lending practices unlawfully
discriminate if:
(i) Those practices result in adverse credit decisions regarding
applicants who are members of a class protected by the Act and
this part; (ii) Such decisions occur at a significantly higher rate
91

Marcia K. Baer, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the "Effects Test", 95
BANKING L.J. 241, 253 (1978) (quoting Roger Kuhn’s testimony before the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System on Aug. 12, 1976).
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than adverse decisions involving applicants who are not
members of the protected class; and (iii) The information or
evaluation criteria underlying the practice does not have a
manifest relationship to the creditor's determination of
creditworthiness.94
In the publication of its revised proposed rule, the FRB added to its
prior commentary on the rule that the purpose of its changes and the
substitution of “to discriminate” for the words “for the purpose of
discriminating” was to “underscore the fact that the general rule
regarding use of information is not limited to intentional acts of
discrimination.”95 The commentary retained all the rest of the July draft’s
explanation of this section except for one line, which was deleted
because it could have been mistakenly interpreted to suggest that a
borrower claiming a violation of the Act is required to show an intent to
discrimination, which is exactly what the borrower does not have to
prove when claiming disparate impact discrimination. In sum, the
November draft of Regulation B was written to give greater weight to the
“effects test” doctrine in the granting of credit, demonstrating the FRB’s
firm commitment to an interpretation of the ECOA as prohibiting
disparate impact discrimination.
After consideration of additional comments, the FRB made last
revisions to the November draft of Regulation B and published a final
rule on January 6, 1977.96 The final rule streamlined the entire issue of
disparate impact liability and the “effects test” by shortening the lengthy
rule and accompanying footnote to simply state in relevant part: “a
creditor may consider any information obtained, so long as the
information is not used to discriminate against an applicant on a
prohibited basis”97 and “[t]he legislative history of the Act indicates that
the Congress intended an ‘effects test’ concept, as outlined in the
employment field by the Supreme Court in the cases of Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. [] and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody [] to be applicable to a
creditor's determination of creditworthiness.”98 The FRB explained again
in its commentary accompanying the final rule that although “the
footnote has been shortened in the final version[,] it refers to the
legislative history of the amended Act, which shows that Congress
intended certain Judicial decisions enunciating the ‘effects test’ in the
94
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employment area to be applied in the credit area, especially with respect
to the allocation of burdens of proof.”99
Since this time, the FRB has made no substantive changes100 to
section 202.6 of Regulation B. The 1977 version, which fully endorses
and implements disparate impact liability, remains the official and
binding interpretation of the scope and meaning of the ECOA’s
prohibition on credit discrimination.101 Pursuant to statute, the FRB
conducted a regular review of Regulation B in 1985 and made a few
substantive revisions to other parts of the Regulation.102 The only
revisions made to section 202.6 during this review, however, were a few
minor structural and editorial changes.103
One such alteration is potentially significant, however, as a further
demonstration of the FRB’s longstanding interpretation that the ECOA
cognizes claims for disparate impact discrimination. The last sentence of
the footnote to section 202.6 of the regulation, which contained a citation
to portions of the legislative history of the ECOA dealing with the
“effects test,” was replaced in favor of a lengthy and explicit exposition
of the “effects test” in an accompanying Official Staff Commentary,
which provides official explanations of all the provisions contained in
Regulation B. Seemingly, therefore, the FRB chose in 1985 to more
prominently display its evidence that the ECOA incorporates disparate
impact liability and its commitment to effectuating Congress’s intent to
outlaw disparate impact discrimination. The Official Staff Commentary
explains:
The effects test is a judicial doctrine that was developed in a
series of employment cases decided by the Supreme Court under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et
seq.). Congressional intent that this doctrine apply to the credit
99
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area is documented in the Senate Report that accompanied H.R.
6516, No. 94-589, pp. 4-5; and in the House Report that
accompanied H.R. 6516, No. 94-210, p. 5. The act and
regulation may prohibit a creditor practice that is discriminatory
in effect because it has a disproportionately negative impact on a
prohibited basis, even though the creditor has no intent to
discriminate and the practice appears neutral on is face, unless
the creditor practice meets a legitimate business need that cannot
reasonably be achieved as well by means that are less disparate
in their impact. For example, requiring that applicants have
incomes in excess of a certain amount to qualify for an overdraft
line of credit could mean that women and minority applicants
will be rejected at a higher rate than men and non-minority
applicants. If there is a demonstrable relationship between the
income requirement and creditworthiness for the level of credit
involved, however, use of the income standard would likely be
permissible.104
In 1995, the Board revisited its Official Staff Commentary to
“provide guidance on several issues including disparate treatment.”105
After reviewing comments and upon further analysis, the FRB rejected
the concerns of commentators about “the Board’s articulation of the
standards of proof and burdens of persuasion under a disparate impact
analysis,” as laid out in the Commentary’s “Effects test” paragraph
(quoted above). In fact, while the FRB “recognize[d] that this is an
evolving area of law, one in which creditors and consumers alike would
benefit from more specificity,” the only revision it did make to its
official commentary on section 202.6 was to add a reference to the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, which codified the standards used for disparate
impact under Title VII.106 The addition of this sentence suggests that the
amended Title VII disparate impact burdens of proof, which Congress
enacted in 1991 to statutorily reverse a Supreme Court decision limiting
disparate impact liability for employment discrimination,107 also apply to
the ECOA.
104
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Around this same time, ten federal agencies charged with enforcing
financial regulations also issued a joint “Policy Statement on
Discrimination in Lending,” explicitly endorsing the availability of
disparate impact claims under the ECOA.108 The statement issued against
a backdrop of judicial suspicion over disparate impact liability to
confirm the position that the FRB has consistently held—that
“[e]vidence of discriminatory intent is not necessary” to prove a
violation of the ECOA.109 Although it is quite convincing to argue that
the ECOA itself clearly authorizes claims for disparate impact
discrimination,110 any statutory silence or ambiguity on this issue is
resolved by the agency Congress charged with implementing the
statute.111 Courts owe substantial deference to an implementing agency’s
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous provision,112 and the FRB’s
determination that the ECOA proscribes lending practices that have a
disparate impact on members of protected classes is not just
reasonable—it is the only logical and legitimate interpretation of the
statute.
E. Circuit Court Decisions and Related Supreme Court Precedent
Every Circuit court to address the issue has ruled that disparate
impact claims are cognizable under the ECOA, and district courts from
nearly every Circuit have also uniformly confirmed or accepted this
conclusion.113 In fact, in recent cases relitigating this issue, defendants
108

59 Fed. Reg. 18,266 (Apr. 15, 1994).
Id. at 18269.
110
See supra Parts IV.A-C.
111
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842–43 (1984).
112
Id.
113
See e.g. Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 963 n.11 (6th Cir. 2005);
Miller v. Am. Express Co., 688 F.2d 1235, 1239–40 (9th Cir.1982); Bhandari v. First
Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 808 F.2d 1082, 1101 (5th Cir.1987), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 492 U.S. 901 (1989); Haynes v. Bank of Wedowee, 634 F.2d 266, 269 n.5
(5th Cir. 1981); see also Barrett v. H & R Block, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108 (D.
Mass. 2009); Guerra v. GMAC LLC, 2:08-CV-01297-LDD, 2009 WL 449153 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 20, 2009); Dismuke v. Connor, 05-CV-1003, 2007 WL 4463567 (W.D. Ark. Dec.
14, 2007); Powell v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 2d 481, 487 (N.D.N.Y. 2004);
Smith v. Chrysler Fin. Co., CIV.A. 00-6003 (DMC), 2003 WL 328719 (D.N.J. Jan. 15,
2003); Wide ex rel. Estate of Wilson v. Union Acceptance Corp., IP 02-0104-C-M/S,
2002 WL 31730920 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 19, 2002); Osborne v. Bank of Am., Nat'l Ass'n.,
234 F.Supp. 2d 804, 811-12 (M.D. Tenn. 2002); Faulkner v. Glickman, 172 F.Supp.2d
732, 737 (D. Md. 2001); Church of Zion Christian Ctr., Inc. v. SouthTrust Bank of
Alabama, CA 96-0922-MJ-C, 1997 WL 33644511 (S.D. Ala. July 31, 1997); Latimore v.
Citibank, F.S.B., 979 F.Supp. 662, 664 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1997); A.B. & S. Auto Serv., Inc. v.
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have been unable to even cite a district court decision that holds the
ECOA does not permit disparate impact claims.114 This uniform and
unbroken body of caselaw, going back over three decades, lends
indisputable support to the interpretation that the ECOA bars disparate
impact discrimination.
Related Supreme Court decisions, many of which are cited in the
legislative history of the Act and were relied upon by the enacting
Congress when writing and voting for the passage of the ECOA,
additionally support the argument that, unless otherwise stated, civil
rights statutes prohibiting discrimination include a prohibition against
some policies that are facially neutral but have a discriminatory effect on
protected groups.115 As discussed above, opponents of disparate impact
liability have attempted to cast the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v.
City of Jackson116 as introducing a rule that anti-discrimination statutes
do not authorize claims for disparate impact discrimination unless those
statutes explicitly prohibit conduct that “adversely affects” a protected
group.117 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (AEDA)—the statute at
issue in Smith—have nearly-identical sections barring employment
discrimination, each containing two distinct provisions: one that
prohibits employers from engaging in employment discrimination
because of an employee’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or
age; and another that outlaws employment policies that would “adversely
affect” an employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, or age.118 The Supreme Court in Griggs interpreted Title VII’s
prohibition on discrimination that “adversely affects” employees to
South Shore Bank of Chi., 962 F.Supp. 1056, 1060 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Gross v. United
States Small Bus. Admin., 669 F. Supp. 50 (N.D.N.Y. 1987); Sayers v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 522 F. Supp. 835 (W.D. Mo. 1981); Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F.
Supp. 1026 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
114
See e.g. Alleyne v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, CIV.A. 07-12128-RWZ, 2008 WL
8901271 (D. Mass. Sept. 12, 2008).
115
See e.g. Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (recognizing
claims for disparate impact race discrimination in employment under Title VII);
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (same); Smith v. City of Jackson,
Mississippi, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (accepting some claims for disparate impact age
discrimination in employment under the AEDA); cf. Thornburg v. Gingles 478 U.S. 30
(1986) (holding that election systems resulting in “vote dilution through submergence”
violate the Voting Rights Act); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 298 (1985)
(assuming the ADA outlaws some claims of disparate impact discrimination).
116
544 U.S. 228 (2005).
117
See supra Part III.
118
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
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outlaw employment policies that have a disparate impact on a protected
class of employees. Decades later, the Smith Court held that the AEDA
also bars disparate impact discrimination on the basis of age, since the
AEDA’s provision barring discrimination that “adversely affects”
employees is nearly identical to the provision at issue in Griggs.
Conversely, the ECOA contains only one general prohibition making
it unlawful for a creditor “to discriminate” against an applicant on a
prohibited basis. Opponents argue that, under Smith, the ECOA’s antidiscrimination provision does not bar disparate impact discrimination
because it does not include an explicit reference to lending practices that
“adversely affect” minority borrowers. However, the Smith decision was
not based exclusively on the presence of the words “adversely affect” or
on the inclusion of two provisions barring discrimination instead of one.
Rather, the Court considered these textual clues along with the statute’s
implementing regulations, the purpose of the AEDA as discerned from
the legislative history, and the uniform interpretation by the Circuit
courts that the AEDA authorizes claims for disparate impact
discrimination.119 Thus, it is not clear at all that the Smith decision
compels an interpretation of the ECOA as permitting disparate impact
discrimination. If anything, the decision requires courts to examine all
available and reliable indicators of whether Congress intended the antidiscrimination statute at issue to outlaw disparate impact discrimination.
In the case of the ECOA, as extensively discussed above, every
indication is that Congress intended to proscribe and provide a remedy
for credit practices that have an indefensible discriminatory effect on
protected groups. It is therefore not surprising that no court presented
with this argument has ruled that Smith mandates a finding that disparate
impact claims are not cognizable under the ECOA.120
119

Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233–40 (2005).
See e.g. Guerra v. GMAC LLC, 2:08-CV-01297-LDD, 2009 WL 449153 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 20, 2009) (citing the following cases: “Hoffman v. Option One Mortgage Corp.,
589 F.Supp.2d 1009, 1010-11 (N.D.Ill.2008) (concluding that Smith does not preclude
disparate impact claims under the FHA and the ECOA); Taylor v. Accredited Home
Lenders, Inc., 580 F.Supp.2d 1062, 1067 (C.D.Cal.2008) (holding that Smith has not
overruled prior precedent recognizing the FHA and the ECOA permit disparate impact
claims); Nat'l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal. v. Accredited Lenders Holding Co., 573
F.Supp.2d 70, 79 (D.D.C.2008) (holding that Smith does not preclude disparate impact
claims brought pursuant to the FHA); Payares v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 07-5540,
2008 WL 2485592, at *1 (C.D.Cal. June 17, 2008) (concluding that Smith does not bar
disparate impact claims under the FHA and the ECOA); Ramirez v. GreenPoint
Mortgage Funding, Inc., No. 08-0369, 2008 WL 2051018, at *4 (N.D.Cal. May 13,
2008) (holding that defendants failed to demonstrate that Smith is “clearly irreconcilable”
with Ninth Circuit precedent holding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under
the FHA and the ECOA); Zamudio v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings, Inc., No. 07-4315, 2008
120
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Another case defendants often rely on is Alexander v. Sandoval,121
which held that the agency charged with implementing Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 may not create a private right of action to sue
for disparate impact discrimination through the administrative
rulemaking process because the statute in no way contemplates a private
right of action. Opponents of disparate impact liability under the ECOA
argue that the FRB may not interpret the ECOA to authorize private
claims for disparate impact discrimination because the ECOA does not
expressly include a provision authorizing such claims. The differences
between Title VI and the ECOA are quite stark, however. Section 601 of
Title VI prohibits programs and agencies receiving federal funding from
discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin; however,
section 602 then contains no “rights-creating” language explicitly
conferring a right on a class of persons,122 and expressly authorizes and
directs federal agencies “to effectuate the provisions of section 601 . . .
by issuing rules, regulations, or orders.”123 Conversely, the ECOA is
directed at private actors and its anti-discrimination provision contains
rights-creating language by conferring a right on applicants to be free of
lending discrimination.
The Court assumed in Sandoval that the implementing agency “may
validly proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on racial groups”
under Title VI, because section 601 is a general anti-discrimination
mandate that is silent on whether it proscribes disparate impact
discrimination.124 The Court held, however, that the agency could not
create a private right to sue for conduct that the agency prohibited by
regulation, but which was not proscribed explicitly by the statute
itself.125 Put succinctly, the Court held only that, “language in a
regulation may invoke a private right of action that Congress through
statutory text created, but it may not create a right that Congress has
WL 517138, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Feb.20, 2008) (concluding that Smith does not bar disparate
impact claims under the FHA and the ECOA); Garcia v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., et al.,
No 07-1161, Am. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, at
*11 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 17, 2008) (declining to hold that Smith overturned Ninth Circuit
precedent recognizing disparate impact claims under the FHA and ECOA); Beaulialice v.
Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., No. 04-2316, 2007 WL 744646, at *4 (M.D.Fla.
Mar.6, 2007) (concluding that Smith does not bar disparate impact claim under the FHA
and assuming the same under the ECOA).”)
121
532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
122
See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979) (“[T]he
right- or duty-creating language of the statute has generally been the most accurate
indicator of the propriety of implication of a cause of action.”)
123
532 U.S. at 288–89.
124
Id. at 275.
125
Id. at 279–82.
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not.”126 Properly understood, therefore, this holding poses no bar to
recognizing a private right of action to sue for disparate impact
discrimination under the ECOA.127 The ECOA itself is directed to the
conduct of private actors and provides a private right of action to enforce
its provisions, one of which bars lending practices that have a
discriminatory effect on protected groups.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the Supreme Court’s interpretive methodology for
determining whether an antidiscrimination statute bars disparate impact
discrimination, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act clearly outlaws credit
lending practices that have a discriminatory effect on protected groups.
This methodology, devised during the civil rights era and reaffirmed as
recently as 2005, instructs courts to consider the statute’s text, legislative
history, purpose, prior interpretations by its implementing agency,
treatment of the issue by the Circuit courts, and related Supreme Court
precedent to holistically and faithfully discern whether Congress
intended its law to carry a prohibition against disparate impact
discrimination and to authorize a right to sue for such conduct.
An examination of the ECOA in light of each of these interpretive
tools unmistakably reveals that the statute’s text bars all forms of lending
discrimination; that the enacting Congress intended to prohibit
widespread and invidious credit practices that adversely effect minority
borrowers; that Congress passed the ECOA for the purpose of ending the
unequal and discriminatory denial or extension of what has become a
necessary and precious commodity; that the agency charged with
interpreting and implementing the ECOA has continuously and
unequivocally endorsed the availability of disparate impact liability
under the Act; that the Circuit courts to address this question have
uniformly ruled that the ECOA bars disparate impact discrimination; and
that the Supreme Court’s precedents fully support the same conclusion.
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